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A Note on Resource Testing and Temptation
Abstract
This study analyzes the relative performance in terms of welfare of the current US PAYG system
compared to an array of cost equivalent alternative specifications of means-tested pension 
programs. We conduct our analysis under two different settings. While in the first setting,
individuals have standard preferences, in the second setting individuals have self-control
preferences. We show that the implications of the reform substantially differs across the two 
settings.
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1 Introduction 
Many social security systems across the world subject pension benefits to some form of earnings 
test. Typically, this takes the form of a reduction in accrued pension benefits according to a 
specific rate ("taper rate") when an individual’s earnings exceed a certain threshold. The rules 
(taper rates, thresholds and type of earnings that are subject to the test) vary significantly 
across countries and pension schemes. In addition, the underlying pension schemes on which 
an earnings test may apply are chosen from a wide array of alternative pension systems, ranging 
from purely "unfunded" (Pay-As-You-Go) to "fully funded." 
On several occasions, means testing has appeared as a simple device to provide adequate 
insurance to lower income households in a budget-neutral way. The idea is that a fiscally 
neutral reallocation of benefits would target poorer households and ensure an adequate and 
more equitable post-retirement income, without compromising any of the core properties of 
insurance provision these programs have for higher income households. Unfortunately, this 
wouldn’t obtain without a cost, especially in the medium / long run: Means-testing is very 
likely to erode the self-financing potential of the system by discouraging individual savings and 
undermining work effort. This, in turn, may increase the medium/long - term fiscal cost of 
means testing and effectively offset one of the main motivations behind means testing, namely, 
maintaining fiscal neutrality. 
Recent empirical and experimental findings in the economics literature have highlighted the 
important impediments to savings that agents may face when their preferences depart from the 
standard specification that has been encountered so far in the literature. This calls therefore, 
for an assessment in a fairly precise and quantifiable manner of the behavioral implications 
of means-testing retirement benefits. A question of particular interest would involve whether 
(and the extent to which) the documented in the means-tested literature distortions related to 
individual savings and labor supply would be further exacerbated (or mitigated) as a function 
of the rate by which retirement benefits are "phased out" in an environment where agents have 
non-standard preferences. 
In this paper, we explore quantitatively the welfare consequences of introducing means 
testing of pensions as an alternative to an earnings dependent and progressive "unfunded" 
(Pay-As-You-Go) program when the population has self-control preferences. To this end, we 
use a general equilibrium OLG model with labor-leisure choice, uninsurable individual income 
shocks, borrowing constraints and missing annuity markets, and calibrate our economy to that 
of the US. We conduct our analysis in two stages involving two economies that only differ 
in agents’ preference specifications, but are otherwise identical. We conduct our analysis in 
a partial equilibrium framework in order to control for the general equilibrium feedback ef-
fects. Our ultimate goal is to assess from a welfare standpoint the scope of the introduction of 
means-testing to an earnings dependent and progressive "unfunded" (Pay-As-You-Go) scheme, 
without altering the expected present value cost (EPVC) of the latter. We restrict our analysis 
to PAYG systems since the different logic and mechanics of "unfunded" versus "funded" sys-
tems eventually induce entirely different risk-sharing properties as well as savings incentives. 
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Therefore, their welfare implications already diverge significantly just because of this difference, 
without taking into account any means-testing policy.1 
The implications of various social security arrangements under different modelling as-
sumptions are well analyzed in the literature.2 Several studies [e.g. Storesletten et al. (1999)] 
comparing different social security systems typically compare welfare across alternative steady 
states, each corresponding to a stationary equilibrium with a different social security system. 
Focusing only on unfunded social security, Imrohoroglu et al. (1995) emphasize the detri-
mental effects that such an arrangement has to the overall welfare in a country. However, all 
the above studies ignore alternative preference specifications that may be binding in several 
cases: Imrohoroglu et al. (2003) and Fehr et al. (2008) use time-inconsistent preferences 
while Kumru & Thanopoulos (2008) use self-control preferences to highlight that in a context 
of unfunded social security welfare may be critically affected by the preference specification.3 
Kumru & Thanopoulos (2011) analyze the welfare and aggregate implications of an array of so-
cial security arrangements in two different economies. In the first economy, all individuals have 
standard preferences in which social security arrangements provide insurance against longevity 
and income fiuctuations but distort savings and labor supply decisions. In the second economy, 
individuals have self-control preferences and hence, the primary function of social security as 
a forced savings mechanisms comes up with an additional benefit: reducing temptation. They 
show that the welfare rankings of the programs significantly differ in two different economies. 
In the current study we extend Kumru & Thanopoulos (2011) and analyze the welfare and ag-
gregate implications of a set of means-tested pension programs as an alternative to the current 
PAYG program. 
Although social insurance benefits have been means-tested for a long time, these policies 
have only recently attracted systematic attention from economists. By using a partial equi-
librium model with a binary labor-leisure choice Sefton et al. (2008) and Sefton & van de 
Ven (2009) analyzed the welfare implications of the means-testing of pension benefits and the 
interactions between various tax schemes and means-tested benefits respectively. Kumru & 
Piggott (2009) extend Sefton et al. (2008)’s model to analyze the implications of means-tested 
benefits in a general equilibrium framework. Both studies report that means-testing increases 
welfare. Golosov & Tsyvinski (2006) analyze the implications of asset (means) testing disab-
ility insurance and find significant welfare gains from asset testing. In a recent paper, Kitao 
(2014) analyzes various social security reform proposals including means-testing of benefits and 
shows that although means-testing can serve as a useful tool from a budget balancing stand-
point, it yields the worst labor disincentives especially among the elderly. In contrast, Cremer, 
Lozachmeur & Pestieau (2008) show analytically that the empirical studies showing that an 
1 See, e.g., Kumru & Thanopoulos (2011) for a comparative analysis of unfunded versus funded systems using 
self-control preferences. 
2 The interest in the welfare implications of a social security system has been sparked with the seminal work of 
Diamond (1965). Earlier quantitative models that assessed the welfare implications of the system were developed 
by Feldstein (1985) and Auerbach & Kotlikoff (1987). 
3 For a detailed introduction to the mechanics of the hyperbolic consumption model and dynamically incon-
sistent preferences see Angeletos et al. (2001). 
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earnings test has an adverse effect on labor supply are not suffi cient evidence to advocate 
their suppression, since the earnings test may be part of an optimal system for agents with 
low values in the parameter they model heterogeneity, i.e., productivity and disutility of labor 
(health status). Despite the fact that literature focusing on analyzing the implications of the 
means-tested pension programs is growing, it is still unknown whether and to what extent wel-
fare and aggregate implications of means-tested pension programs are sensitive to individuals’ 
self-control problems and this is the area our paper aims to contribute. 
In order to capture our agents’temptation towards current consumption, our model eco-
nomies make use of the preference structure pioneered by Strotz (1956) and Phelps & Pollak 
(1968) and further elaborated by Gul & Pesendorfer (2004) to model self-control issues. Gul & 
Pesendorfer (2004) identified a particular class of utility functions that provide a time-consistent 
model suitable for addressing the preference reversals that motivated the time inconsistency 
literature. The key theme here is that self-control preferences assume that agents maximize a 
utility function that is a ‘compromise’between the standard utility (or ‘commitment’utility) 
and a ‘temptation’ utility. The confiicting ways by which agents derive utility in this set-
ting, is the device through which the trade-off between the temptation to consume on the one 
hand, and the long-run self interest of the agent on the other is captured. The main benefit is 
that self-control preferences remain perfectly time-consistent and, contrary to time-inconsistent 
preferences, allow agents in our model to commit. With the exception of the aforementioned 
difference in the specification of preferences, our model specification follows that of Huggett & 
Parra (2010). 
Our paper’s contribution to the literature is two-fold. First, it enhances the scope of studies 
on means-testing by taking self-control issues into consideration. This allows us to analyze the 
possible interaction between means-testing and self-control issues, and to explore the possibility 
to identify separately the disincentives to savings that are due to either of those. Second, in 
contrast to earlier studies on means-testing, our paper compares means-tested programs in 
two different settings. In the first setting, we keep the expected present value cost of the all 
programs including the PAYG program constant. This allows us to isolate the implications of 
the phase-out rate. Later, we also look at the implications of the means-testing, varying the 
benefit rate while keeping the minimum guaranteed benefit fixed i.e. varying the EPVC. 
Our results show that individuals’self-control problems would have a role in determining 
the welfare ranking of the programs. When the cost of the system fixed, lower taper rates do 
not generate additional tax distortions. When individuals have standard preferences, 80% taper 
rate generates the highest welfare among the means-tested programs. This is because 80% taper 
rates improves the distribution of income and hence, generates higher welfare. Interestingly, 
when individuals have self-control preferences, 0% taper rate generates the highest welfare 
among means-tested programs. When individuals have self-control preferences, they would like 
to avoid high temptation. Higher taper rates enlarge the choice sets of certain individuals and 
increase their self-control costs. On other hand, 0% taper rate provides a lower amount of 
benefits to all individuals without increasing certain individuals’ self-control costs. In other 
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sj µj−1 
µj = for j = 2, 3, ..., J, 1 + n 
words, when individuals have self-control preferences, 0% taper rate’s self-control cost reducing 
benefit exceeds higher taper rates’redistributional benefits. 
When the cost of the program is varied, lower taper rates come up with huge tax distortions 
and hence, in both cases, means-tested programs with 100% taper rates maximizes the welfare. 
In this case, it is important to note that, all means-tested programs generate higher welfare 
benefits than the PAYG pension program. When individuals have self-control references, higher 
taper rates generate larger welfare gain. Since the cost of the system varies, even individuals 
with self-control preferences prefer the system with low tax distortions. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In sections 2 and 3, we present the model 
economy and the calibration process, respectively. Section 4 presents the results and Section 
5 concludes. The details of numerical analysis and the remaining figures are reported in the 
Appendix. 
2 The Model Economy 
We use a general equilibrium OLG model economy with uninsured idiosyncratic shocks to labor 
productivity and mortality. 
2.1 Demographics and Endowments 
Time is discrete. The economy is populated by overlapping generations of individuals. Each 
ıj  J = 1, 2, ..., j∗, ...J  period t a new generation is born.4 Let ∈ { } denote age. Individuals 
live a maximum of J periods and retire at an exogenously determined retirement age j∗and 
receive relevant pension benefits. The population grows at a constant rate n. An individual’s 
probability of surviving up to age j conditional on surviving up to age j  1− , is denoted by 
sj . Demographic patterns are stable and the constant cohort share of the generation j can be 
written as follows: 
(1)
�J
j=1 µj = 1. where 
An agent’s labor productivity in period j (equivalently at age j) is given by a function 
ω(ej , j) mapping the period shock ej and the individual’s age j into labor productivity - effective 
units of labor unit per unit of time worked. 
4 Because we are only interested in steady state values, time subscripts will be dropped from the equations 
during the rest of the analysis. 
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2.2 Preferences 
We consider two distinct economies. In the first economy, individuals have preferences over 
consumption and leisure sequence {cj , (1  lj ) J j=1 − } represented by a standard time separable 
utility function. In the second economy, individuals have recursive self-control preferences. Let 
V (x) denote the maximized value of the expected discounted objective function with state x. 
The utility function of an agent with standard preferences is as follows: 
V (x) = max u(c, 1 − l) + βEV (x1), 
c,l 
(2) 
where E is the expectation operator, β is the time-discount factor, and x1 denotes next period 
state variable. Expectations are taken over the stochastic processes that govern idiosyncratic 
labor productivity risk and longevity. 
In the second economy, agents feature self-control preferences. That is, their preferences are 
such that in every period they induce a temptation to consume their entire wealth. Resisting 
temptation gives rise to a self-control cost; note that the latter feature is absent in models with 
CRRA and quasi-hyperbolic preferences. We follow Gul & Pesendorfer (2004) and DeJong & 
Ripoll (2007) and proceed to model self-control preferences recursively. 
Let V (x) denote the maximized value of the expected discounted objective function with 
state x. The utility function of an agent is as follows: 
ˇ
1)} − max 
c 
V (x) = max {u(c, 1 − l) + v(c) + βEW (x
c,l 
v(cˇ),
 
where E is the expectation operator; u(.) and v(.) are momentary utility and temptation 
functions, respectively; c represents the "commitment" consumption; and cˇ is the "temptation" 
(3)
 
ˇ
v(c) − max 
c 
v(cˇ) consumption. In particular, 
c instead of cˇ. 
2.3 The Public Sector 
We model tax and transfer functions following Huggett & Parra (2010). They capture the 
features of the US social security and federal income taxation. The tax function Tj is the sum 
of social security (Tj
s) and federal income (Tj
inc) tax functions. Let x1j 
 , x2j , and yj stand for 
an individual’s average earnings up to period j, asset holdings, and labor income respectively. 
Notice that 
denotes the disutility from choosing consumption
 
yj = wω(ej , j)lj . 
Tj (x 
1 
j , x 
2 
j , yj ) = Tj
s(x 1 j , yj ) + T 
inc 
j (x
 
1 2 
j , x j , yj ). (4)
 
2.3.1 Income Taxes 
We determine income taxes in the model economy by applying an income taxation to an 
individual’s income. More specifically, we choose income taxes Tj
inc 21(xj , xj , yj ) before and after 
6
 
the retirement age j∗ that successfully mimic the average effective tax rates for two types of 
households: head of household is 65 or older, and head of household is younger than 65. When 
generating the tax function we follow the steps in Huggett & Parra (2010). First, we use a 
quadratic function passing through the origin that minimizes the squared deviations of the 
tax function from data to approximate the 2001 income tax data. Second, we express our 
model in 2001 dollars. Third, the average tax rates on model income is calculated by using 
the estimated tax function. Model income is the sum of labor income yj , asset income x2j  , and 
pension benefits. 
Since individuals face stochastic life-span, and private annuity markets are closed by as-
sumption, a fraction of the population will leave accidental bequests. The government con-
fiscates all accidental bequests and delivers them to the remaining population in a lump-sum 
manner. We denote these transfers by ηt. Finally, the government faces a sequence of exo-
genously given consumption expenditures Gt ∞ t=1{ } . This consumption will be financed through 
income taxes and taxes on consumption (τ c). 
2.3.2 Pensions 
In the benchmark case, the social security mimics the US earnings-dependent PAYG social 
security. More precisely, the model social security system taxes an individual’s labor income and 
makes pension payments after retirement. Taxes are proportional to labor earnings for earnings 
up to maximum taxable level ymax. The social security tax rate is denoted by τ s.Starting with 
retirement age j∗, an individual receives pension benefits b(x1) which is a fixed function of 
equally weighted average earnings x1up to age  j∗. The earnings that enter into the calculation 
of of x1 are capped at the maximum y . After the retirement x1max remains constant at its 
value at retirement. 
� 
1 1 xj+1 = [min{yj , ymax} + (j − 1)xj ]/j 
τ s min{yj , ymax} : j < j∗ 
T s 1 j (xj , yj ) = −b(x1) : j ≥ j∗ (5)
The relationship between average past earnings x1 and social security benefits b(x1) mimics 
that of the US. As in the US system, benefits are a piecewise-linear function of average past 
earnings.5 We set the bend points and the maximum earnings equal to the actual values used in 
the US social security system, i.e., the first, second, and third segments of the benefit function 
have slopes equal to 0.90, 0.32, and 0.15 respectively. The bend points occur at 0.21 and 1.29 
5 After normalizing the average past earnings and benefits to measure them as multiples of the average 
earnings in the US, the US social security system benefits have the following structure: the first, second, and 
third segments of the benefit function have slopes equal to 0.90, 0.32, and 0.15 respectively. The bend points 
occur at 0.21 and 1.29 times average earnings and the maximum earnings that enter into the benefit calculation 
are equal to 2.42 times the average earnings. These normalized values are calculated by Huggett & Parra (2010) 
using the data provied in the Social Security Handbook (2003). 
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⎨
 ⎬
2 2x x 1 2 
j , xj , yj ) when j < J, 
j+1 ≤ (1 + r) j + yj − Tj (xr cj + (1 + g) r 
2⎩
 x ⎭
1 2− Tj (xj , xj , yj ) when jj r cJ = (1 + r) = J.
 
⎨
 ⎬
2 2x x 1 2 
j , xj , yj ) when j < J, 
j+1 ≤ (1 + r) j + yj − Tj (xr cˇj + (1 + g) r 
2⎩
 x ⎭
j 
r 
1 2− Tj (xj , xj , yj ) when jcˇJ = (1 + r) = J.
 
�
 
2 
T s 1 
τ s(yj + xj ) : j < j
∗ 
j (xj , yj ) = , 2−b∗ j (xj ) : j ≥ j∗ 
times average earnings and the maximum earnings that enter into the benefit calculation are 
equal to 2.42 times the average earnings. 
Subsequently, we replace the earnings-related PAYG with a means-tested pension program. 
In the means-tested program, retirees’benefits are determined through income and asset tests. 
If income and asset levels are lower than the threshold levels, retirees receive the full penison 
(bmax), otherwise their benefits are reduced by the benefit reduction (taper) rate, φ  [0, 1]∈ . 
The means-tested pension program is financed through a fiat tax on working age individual’s 
income. 
(6)
where 
2 2b ∗ j (xj ) = max{bmax − φ(xj ), 0}. j (7)
2.4 An Individual’s Decision Problem 
Hence, the agent’s growth-adjusted budget constraint can be written as ⎧ ⎫
(8)

We further assume that agents cannot borrow against their future income at any age: 
2 xj � 0, ∀j. (9) 
An individual’s decision problem in our model economy can be written as a dynamic pro-
gramming problem. Denote the value function of the agent at age j by Vj and state vector 
2x = (xj , ej ).The decision problem of an agent without self-control problems is represented by 
the following form: 
Vj(x) = max 
cj ,lj 
{u(cj , 1 − lj ) + βsj+1EVj+1(x 1)} (10) 
subject to equations 8 and 9. Note that x1 denotes the next period’s state vector. 
The decision problem of an agent with self-control problems can be written as 
Vj (x) = max 
cj ,lj 
{u(cj , 1 − lj ) + v(cj ) + βsj+1EVj+1(x 1)} − max 
cˇj 
v(cˇj ) (11) 
The agent’s budget constraint for temptation function reads as follows: ⎧ ⎫
(12)

subject to the equations 8, 12, and 9. 
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�  
Λj+1(x) = Π(ej+1, ej ) dΛj 
e X 
�
� 
� � 
J � 
2K = µj xj (x)dΛj , 
j=1 X 
j� ∗−1 � 
L = µj lj (x)dΛj , 
j=1 X 
J
C = µj cj (x)dΛj . 
j=1 X 
� �	 � 
� �	 � 
J	 j� ∗−1 
µj bj (x
1)dΛj = τ s µj min{yj (x), ymax}dΛj . 
j=j∗ X j=1 X 
J j� ∗−1 
b∗ 2µj j (xj )dΛj = τ s µj yj (x)dΛj . 
j=j∗ X j=1 X 
� J � 
2η = µj (1 − sj+1)x (x)dΛj .j 
j=1 X 
2.5 Equilibrium 
Our equilibrium definition follows Auerbach & Kotlikoff (1987), Imrohoroglu et al. (2003), 
and Huggett & Ventura (1999). We suppose that the pension system is self-financing and the 
government runs a balanced budget. The pension programs’tax rate, τ s  and the consumption 
tax rate, τ c are endogenously determined in order to satisfy the balanced budget conditions. 
1	 2Tj (xj , xj , yj )Given a time-invariant government tax-transfer function  and relative prices 
of labor and capital {w, r}, a stationary equilibrium is defined as a set of value functions 
2s cj (.), xj (.), lj (.)
J, ,j=1{Vj (x) J j=1} , individuals’decision rule { }  , pension program tax rate τ s and
consumption tax rate τ c, and age dependent distributions of individuals Λj (x) that must satisfy 
the following conditions: 
2{cj (.), cˇj (.), xj (.), lj (.)}J, j=1 1. Given fiscal policy and prices, individuals’decision rules solve 
(a) individuals’ decision problem 10 subject to constraints 8 and 9 when they have 
standard preferences. 
(b) individuals’decision problem 11 subject to constraints 8, 9, and 12. 9. 
2. The age dependent and time-invariant measure of individuals is computed as follows: 
, where Π(ej+1, ej ) is the transition matrix for the shocks. 
Λ1(x) is given. 
3. Aggregate capital stock, labor supply,	 and consumption are derived from individuals’ 
behaviors: 
4. Age pension programs are self-financing: 
5. The sum of accidental bequests satisfies the following equation: 
6. The government’s income tax revenue is given by:
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� � J
T incTi = (x)dΛj .µj j 
j=1 X 
7. The government runs a balanced budget: 
G = Ti + τ cC + η. 
8. The goods market clears: 
C + (1 + g)(1 + n)K + G = Y + (1 − δ)K. 
3 Calibration 
This section defines the parameter values of our model. The values of the calibrated parameters 
for the benchmark economy are presented in Table 1. Since our benchmark model mimics that 
of Huggett & Parra (2010), we mainly set model parameters equal to those of Hugget and 
Parra. In their parameter value setting, Huggett & Parra (2010) use the values estimated 
by Kaplan (2012). Estimated values of the model parameters account for the cross-sectional, 
variance-covariance patterns of hours, consumption, and wages at different ages over the life-
cycle. 
Demographics Each model period corresponds to a year. Individuals are born at a real 
age of 25 (model age of 1), retire at a real age of 65 (model age of 41) and they can live up to 
a maximum real life age of 80 (model age of 56). The population growth rate is assumed to be 
equal to the long-term average growth rate of the US’s population i.e. n = 1.1%. The sequence 
of conditional survival probabilities in the model, sj is set equal to the sequence of conditional 
survival probabilities taken from Conesa et al. (2009). 
1 
j + ω(ej , j) = ζj exp(e
Labor productivity has two major components: a deterministic component ζj and 
Labor Productivity Process An agent’s labor productivity is 
32 
j + ej )e
 . 
an idiosyncratic shock component ej 1 j + e
2 
j + e
3).(e
=
 j 
tures the differences in the permanent (e ), 1j persistent (e
2 
j 
The idiosyncratic shock component cap-
) , and temporary (e
3j 
 ) sources of
 
productivity. The permanent component stays fixed over the agent’s life-cycle and is normally
 
distributed by N( σ
21/2, σ

2
1)− .
 The persisitent component follows the following autoregress-
2 2 
j−1 + ϕj , ϕj ρe
e
 =
 j 
An agent’s wage at age j is determined by a fixed wage rate w per effi ciency 
2
2)N(0, σ

3e
 is j ive process:
 .The temporary component distibuted by
 ∼ 
N( σ
23/2, σ

2
3)− .
 
unit of labor and by labor productivity ω(ej , j). We set the persistent shock to zero for each 
agent at model age of 1. The deterministic component is set in a way that wages approximately 
double over the life cycle. Each productiivy process is approximated with a discrete number of 
shocks.6 
6 The approximation process follows Tauchen (1986). For details see Huggett & Parra (2010). 
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(1−ν) (1 − l)(1−γ)c
u(c, 1 − l) = + κ . 
(1 − υ) (1 − γ) 
2xj 1 2cˇj = (1 + r) + ıyj  Tj (xj , xj , yj )r 
Preferences We use an additively seperable period utility function: Individuals have 
time-separable preferences over consumption and leisure: 
The period temptation function is given as λu(c, 1  l)− ,where λ is a temptation parameter. 
Following the earlier literature on temptation we assume individuals are tempted to consume 
all their wealth in a given period i..e. − , where yıj is the labor 
income when temptation consumption is chosen. Following Huggett & Parra (2010), we set 
the period utility function parameters equal to Kaplan (2012)’s estimates.These estimates are 
compatible with the values estimated in the literature by using micro-level consumption and 
labor data. In particular, we set the coeffi cient of risk aversion parameter (υ) equal to 1.66 
and the coeffi cient that governs the Frisch elasticity of labor (γ) equal to 5.55.7 Finally, we set 
κ = 0.13, which is the mean value estimated by Kaplan (2012). We follow DeJong & Ripoll 
(2007) and Kumru & Thanopoulos (2011) in choosing the values of the temptation strength 
parameter λ. We set the value of the time-discount factor β in a way that it generates the 
target capital-output ratio. 
Government Policy The parameter values of the benchmark model’s tax-transfer sys-
tem are chosen in a way that they can mimic the features of the US social security and income 
tax system. In particular, we set the social secuirty tax rate τ to 10.6%. The social security 
benefit function and income tax function follow the US tax-transfer system closely as we ex-
pressed in more detail earlier. We set the minimum guaranteed value of means-tested pension 
income, bmax to 5% of output per capita in the model. This benefit is reduced by a taper rate 
applied to any private income. We vary the taper rates at 10% increments between 0% and 
100%.We set government expenditure G to 22% of GDP. 
7 Note that the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is equal to 0.27 when γ = 5.55 and l = 0.4. 
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Parameter Value Target
 
Demographics 
Maximum possible life span J 56 (real age of 80) Assumed certain death 
Obligatory retirement age j∗ 41 (real age of 65) Assumed compulsory retirement 
Growth rate of population n 1.1% Data 
Conditional survival probabilities {sj }J j=1 Conesa et al. (2009) Data
Endowments 
Age effi ciency profile { ∗j¯ }je −1 j=1 Kaplan (2007) Data
(σ21, σ
2
2, σ
2
3, ρ) (.056, .019, .072, .946) Data 
Preferences 
Annual discount factor of utility β 0.995 K/Y=2.7 
υ 1.66 IES=0.5 
γ 5.55 Frisch Elasticity=0.27 
κ 0.13 Data 
Temptation parameter λ DeJong (2007) Data 
Government 
Social security tax rate τ s %10.6 Hugget and Parra (2009) 
Social security benefit function Huggett and Parra (2009) Data 
Minimum guaranteed pension income bmax 5% of output per capita 
Taper rate φ Various rates 
Consumption tax rate τ c 5% Conesa et al. (2009) 
Income tax Huggett and Parra (2009) Data 
Table 1: Parameter Values of The Benchmark Calibration
 
4 Results 
We have two economies that are identical except individuals’preference specifications. In the 
first economy, all individuals have standard preferences while in the second economy indi-
viduals have self-control preferences. Our aim here is to compare the aggregate and welfare 
consequences of the replacement of the current PAYG social security system with a resource 
tested old age pension program. In our experiments, we first keep the expected present value 
cost (EPVC) of various programs fixed. 
As a result, for each taper rate, we need to increase the amount of the maximum benefits 
to keep the EPVC constant across programs. Keeping the cost of the programs constant allows 
us to pin down the welfare effects of the various taper rates only. The earlier studies (see for 
example Sefton et al. (2008)) that analyze the welfare effects of resource testing basically vary 
taper rates without adjusting the maximum amount of pensions. This, in turn results in various 
programs that differ in terms of costs and make an isolated comparison harder. From Table 2 
we see that replacing the current progressive PAYG system by a means tested pension program 
of equivalent cost, results in welfare loss. Table 2 also reveals that, among the compared taper 
rates, the 80% taper rate resource testing program is the best. Compared to the 100% taper 
rate, the 80% allows a higher fraction of the population (mainly coming from relatively higher 
incomes) to "pass" the means-testing criterion and thus enjoy retirement benefits. At the same 
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Taper Rate Max Pension Benefit EPVC L EU
 
PAYG −0.95 0.3921 100 
0 0.041 −0.95 0.3715 99.0757 
0.2 0.074 −0.95 0.3732 99.1344 
0.4 0.100 −0.95 0.3739 99.1551 
0.6 0.121 −0.95 0.3745 99.1554 
0.8 0.138 −0.95 0.3749 99.1604 
1 0.152 −0.95 0.3751 99.1469 
Table 2: Standard Preferences - Fixed Cost Pension System
 
Taper Rate Max Pension Benefit EPVC L EU
 
PAYG −0.95 0.3921 100 
0 0.041 −0.95 0.3715 99.0757 
0.2 0.041 −0.48 0.3675 101.3546 
0.4 0.041 −0.29 0.3655 102.2472 
0.6 0.041 −0.22 0.3656 102.5866 
0.8 0.041 −0.18 0.3642 102.7968 
1.0 0.041 −0.14 0.3639 102.9437 
Table 3: Standard Preferences - Variable Cost Pension System 
time, the fact that the taper rate is not very low, allows for the maximum benefit (to be given 
mainly to lower incomes) to remain high, in order to keep EPVC constant. So, overall welfare is 
maximized, because there is an improvement on both extremes of the income distribution that 
pass the means testing criterion. This result is interesting in the sense that the replacement of 
a progressive earnings-related PAYG program by a resource testing program ends up reducing 
welfare for all taper rates considered. 
In our second experiment (Table 3), we keep benefits constant and vary taper rates. Hence, 
the EPVC of the resource testing program varies with taper rates i.e. the higher the taper 
rate is, the lower the EPVC. When we keep benefits fixed, replacing the PAYG program by 
a means-tested program increases welfare. Not surprisingly, the higher the taper rate, the 
larger the welfare gain is, since an increased fraction of the population ends up passing the 
criterion and enjoys retirement benefits. Cross-comparison of this experiment with the earlier 
one reveals that the welfare gain coming from the replacement of a PAYG system by a means-
tested program hinges on the lower EPVC. When we control the cost, there is no welfare gain 
through means-test replacement, yet substantial welfare gain occurs when PAYG is replaced 
by means-tested pension programs of increasingly higher taper rates. 
In Table 4, we present the results of our experiments assuming individuals suffer from self-
control problems. Earlier studies firmly established that the negative welfare implications of a 
PAYG program are mitigated when individuals have self-control preferences. Yet, we do not 
know whether self-control problems and resource tested pension programs interact in a similar 
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Taper Rate Max Pension Benefit EPVC L EU
 
PAYG −0.95 0.3937 100 
0.0 0.041 −0.95 0.3799 99.6837 
0.2 0.070 −0.95 0.3812 99.6735 
0.4 0.095 −0.95 0.3821 99.6475 
0.6 0.114 −0.95 0.3825 99.6202 
0.8 0.129 −0.95 0.3827 99.5932 
1.0 0.141 −0.95 0.3830 99.5379 
Table 4: Self-control Preferences - Fixed Cost Pension System
 
Taper Rate Max Pension Benefit EPVC L EU
 
PAYG −0.95 0.3937 100 
0.0 0.041 −0.95 0.3799 99.6837 
0.2 0.041 −0.53 0.3762 101.7924 
0.4 0.041 −0.33 0.3741 102.7502 
0.6 0.041 −0.25 0.3732 103.1369 
0.8 0.041 −0.20 0.3730 103.3675 
1.0 0.041 −0.17 0.3727 103.5093 
Table 5: Self-control Preferences - Variable Cost Pension System 
fashion. Table 4 tells us that, when the EPVC of the programs is fixed, the welfare consequences 
of replacing the PAYG with a resource testing program is similar between an economy populated 
by standard agents and one populated by self-control agents, i.e., the PAYG dominates any 
resource testing problem. Yet, there are two main differences between the two economies. 
Welfare decreases relatively less in the self-control economy and among resource testing pension 
programs, the program with 0% taper rate generates the highest welfare. In order to secure 
"universal access" to the minimum pension benefit (no actual means testing) while at the same 
time keep EPVC constant, the maximum pension benefit has to fall considerably. This, in 
turn, spares self-control agents from the consumption opportunities they would have if they 
had higher maximum pension benefits, hence, the lower the taper rate, the better for the higher 
income self control individuals. In this environment it seems that the welfare implications of 
various taper rates are not much affected by the existence of self-control problems. 
When we fix pension benefits (Table 5), on the other hand, we see that higher taper rates 
generate much higher welfare gain when individuals have self-control problems. This could be 
again due to the fact that self-control agents are deprived consumption opportunities. 
5 Conclusion 
Means testing has come to add yet another important dimension in the academic and policy 
debate regarding the monetary burden that the mere presence and administration of a social 
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security system entails for the society, and the associated budget implications that the provision 
of old age, disability, unemployment and health insurance effectively has. On the one hand, 
population aging has raised challenges and concerns to policy makers about the adequacy of 
the existing insurance programs to deal with the consumption needs of a growing number of 
elderly dependents. Although age pension programs vary in terms of their benefit, financing and 
coverage structures, they all provide longevity insurance and can be welfare improving when 
private annuities markets are missing or when individuals do not save enough for retirement 
because of myopia. On the other hand, amidst the economic crisis, markets are concerned 
about long-term fiscal sustainability and the ability of policy makers to address these challenges, 
especially in debt laden countries. 
In this paper, we explored quantitatively the welfare consequences of introducing means 
testing of pensions as an alternative to an earnings dependent and progressive "unfunded" (Pay-
As-You-Go) program when agents have self-control preferences. To this end, we employed a 
partial equilibrium OLG model with labor-leisure choice, uninsurable individual income shocks, 
borrowing constraints and missing annuity markets, and calibrated our economy to that of the 
US. 
Our analysis was executed in two stages involving two economies that only differ in agents’ 
preference specifications, but are identical in all other aspects. Our ultimate goal has been to 
assess, from a welfare standpoint, the scope of the introduction of means-testing to an earnings-
dependent and progressive "unfunded" (Pay-As-You-Go) scheme, without altering the expected 
present value cost (EPVC) of the latter. 
Our paper’s contribution to the literature is two-fold: first, it enhances the scope of studies 
on means-testing by taking self-control issues into consideration. This allows us to analyze the 
possible interaction between means-testing and self-control issues, and to explore the possibility 
to identify separately the disincentives to savings that are due to either of those. Second, in 
contrast to earlier studies on means-testing, our paper compares means-tested programs in 
two different settings. In the first setting, we keep the expected present value cost of the all 
programs, including the PAYG program, constant. This allows us to isolate the implications 
of the phase-out rate. Later, we also look at the implications of the means-testing, varying the 
taper rate while keeping the minimum guaranteed benefit fixed, i.e., varying the EPVC. 
Our results can prove useful from both a theoretical and a policy making perspective. On 
the former front, disentangling the effects that self control on the one hand, and the taper rate 
on the other, have on savings behavior, allows for a more realistic assessment of means-testing 
in terms of welfare in light of recent findings in the economics literature that highlight the 
importance of preferences. On the latter front, policy makers should be cautious with policy 
recommendations based on fine-tuning of a tool such as the taper rate, as this may function in 
a complementary way with unobserved heterogeneity in agents’preferences (here, self-control 
issues) and compromise severely the effectiveness of the tool. 
Our results show that individuals’self-control problems would have a role in determining 
the welfare ranking of the programs. When the cost of the system fixed, lower taper rates do 
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not generate additional tax distortions. When individuals have standard preferences, 80% taper 
rate generates the highest welfare among the means-tested programs. This is because 80% taper 
rates improves the distribution of income and hence, generates higher welfare. Interestingly, 
when individuals have self-control preferences, 0% taper rate generates the highest welfare 
among means-tested programs. When individuals have self-control preferences, they would like 
to avoid high temptation. Higher taper rates enlarge the choice sets of certain individuals and 
increase their self-control costs. On other hand, 0% taper rate provides a lower amount of 
benefits to all individuals without increasing certain individuals’ self-control costs. In other 
words, when individuals have self-control preferences, 0% taper rate’s self-control cost reducing 
benefit exceeds higher taper rates’redistributional benefits. 
When the cost of the program is varied, lower taper rates come up with huge tax distortions 
and hence, in both cases, means-tested programs with 100% taper rates maximizes the welfare. 
In this case, it is important to note that, all means-tested programs generate higher welfare 
benefits than the PAYG pension program. When individuals have self-control references, higher 
taper rates generate larger welfare gain. Since the cost of the system varies, even individuals 
with self-control preferences prefer the system with low tax distortions. 
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